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ABSTRACT: This article studies the impact of a range of state institutions on
citizens’ contacts with family and close friends in 20 countries. Recent
studies have shown large country level differences in social participation. We
aim to explain these differences from an actor centered institutionalist
perspective. We present two lines of reasoning. According to the first, a high
level of social security crowds out social participation, as intimate networks
are no longer needed as an economic safety net. The second line of reasoning
proposes that corruption or a lack of civil rights drive citizens to seek refuge
in their secure intimate contacts. In a comparative, multi-level design we
focus on participation in the nuclear family, in the extended family, and with
the best friend. We test the two lines of reasoning simultaneously on ISSP
2001 data. We find that states matter. State institutions are an important
determinant of social participation. Our findings mainly confirm the second
line of reasoning, whereas the crowding out thesis is only supported for
contact with the extended family. Moreover, we find that the contextual
effects are not similar across social groups: the poor are more strongly
affected by the institutional design than the rich.
Key words: social networks; welfare state; new institutionalism; ISSP;
family; friends
1. Introduction
Public wisdom holds that it is hard, if not impossible, for states to control
family life. Nevertheless, in recent years scholars have emphasized the
‘critical facilitating role’ (Szreter 2002) of state institutions on social












































place in the intimate sphere. Yet, despite this theoretical debate, empirical
research remains remarkably scarce and inconclusive. This cross-national
study aims to fill this empirical gap.
Large country level differences in various forms of participation have
been found by several authors since Almond and Verba (1963), but remain
largely unexplained empirically. Several authors have criticized the
cultural explanations offered by Putnam (1993) and Fukuyama (1995),
who overlooked the important role of the state in facilitating social
participation, e.g., Levi (1996), Tarrow (1996), Onyx and Bullen (2001),
and Szreter (2002). The latter authors propose the state and its institutions
to be important determinants of social participation: the state provides the
formal institutional framework within which social participation takes
place.
Yet, little empirical research has been done to actually test the impact of
state institutions on various forms of participation (Parboteeah et al. 2004;
Freitag 2006). This is most apparent for social participation. As a field of
interest social participation has remained separate from other forms of
participation until recently (Stolle and Hooghe 2005). Consequently, no
more than a few comparative studies (e.g., Scheepers et al. 2002; Van
Oorschot and Arts 2005; Ka¨a¨ria¨inen and Lehtonen 2006; Pichler and
Wallace 2007) have looked at the association between state institutions and
social participation. Moreover, these studies focused on a single state
institution, rather than a range of them. In this contribution, we address
the following questions:
a. To what extent do the levels of social participation differ cross-
nationally?
b. To what extent do state institutions determine the different levels of
social participation, taking individual characteristics into account?
c. To what extent is the impact of state institutions on social participation
similar across social categories?
In search for answers to our research questions we take up an actor
centered institutionalist approach (Scharpf 1997). This approach focuses
on institutions as ‘enduring structural constraints on human behaviour’
(Cortell and Petersen 1999). We specifically look at the constraints
induced by national level state institutions: general state policies and
standard government practices. State institutions are inert (Krasner 1984):
they hardly change, and if they do it is mostly through small, incremental
steps (Cortell and Petersen 1999). We focus on the rather stable
institutions of western, liberal-democratic countries (Harty 2005). As it






































we should consider a short time lag between the measurements of state
institutions and social participation.
This study is primarily concerned with the interplay between two levels
of analysis: the individual and the state. Although other levels (i.e., the
groups our respondents are part of, or the neighbourhood/municipality
they live in) might be important for social participation as well (cf. Tilly
2005), we can not include them: the cross-national survey does not include
information at intermediate levels. Moreover, we have no a-priori reason to
assume that the exclusion of meso-levels from our analysis will affect our
study on the impact of state institutions on social participation.
2. Social participation
The extent to which individuals contact, meet, visit or invite close family
or their best friend is what we label social participation. We thus focus on
the frequency of interaction between individuals, also referred to as
‘associational solidarity’ (Mangen et al. 1988). Social participation is
assumed to have profound intended and non-intended consequences.
Instrumentally, informal networks are used as a source of information on
jobs (Moerbeek 2001), and to contact professionals outside of the
traditional channels (Mars and Altman 1992). Informal social contacts
may provide people with access to a larger social network (Halpern 2005),
as well as skills (Bowlby 1988), physical and mental health (Putnam 2000).
Through social participation, people are socialized into wider society,
either with pro-civic (Fukuyama 1995) or anti-civic (Banfield 1958)
attitudes.
In contrast to other forms of participation, social participation is based
on the informal and primordial ties of family (kinship) and the local
community (clanship). Kin and clan are ‘supposed to be a strong social
community based on shared norms and values and consisting of members
with a natural function to help and care for each other’ (Komter and
Vollebergh 2002). Friendship ties are chosen, family ties are ascribed. Yet,
ascribed or not, to some degree individuals can choose to what extent they
involve themselves in these ties. We claim that this element of choice is
framed by state institutions. In the next sections we provide two
mechanisms to explain such a relationship.
3. Hypotheses: crowding out thesis
First, we propose the crowding out thesis, which can be traced back to the
writings of Tocqueville and Nisbet. In this approach, family and
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friendship bonds function as a safeguard against economic hardship.
Those who are aware of their (financial) dependency may invest in their
family ties to construct an economic safety net (Flap 1999). However,
states may also take up the function of an economic safety net by offering
social security against unemployment, disability and disease, and by
offering state pensions / not as charity, but as an individual right.
Thereby, the state takes over the supportive role of family and friends
(Habermas 1990 [1961]): people have less material incentives to participate
in informal networks. In short: ‘Social expenditures and comprehensive
social programs ‘crowd out’ informal caring relations and social networks,
as well as familial, communal and occupational systems of self-help and
reciprocity’ (Van Oorschot and Arts 2005). Vice versa, states that lack such
extensive social security systems force their citizens to rely on their
families and friends and hence stimulate social participation.
Evidence for the crowding out thesis is mixed at best (cf. Scheepers et
al. 2002; Van Oorschot and Arts 2005; Ka¨a¨ria¨inen and Lehtonen 2006).
Yet, the differential findings might be reconciled when we consider that
the crowding out effect may not be equally strong for different social
groups. We expect that the inverse relationship between social security and
social participation is stronger for people with a low income than for
people with a high income, as the latter have less economic incentives to
participate socially to begin with. People with a low income depend more
on social security than people with a high income. Therefore, the
crowding out effect of social security should be more apparent among
the economically weak / i.e., the poor.
In line with the first approach, we test the following hypotheses on the
effects of state institutions:
H1a The lower the level of social security in a welfare state, the higher the level of
social participation.
H1b The effect of social security on social participation is stronger for economic-
ally weak people (i.e., the poor and social security recipients) than for economically
strong people (i.e., the rich and the employed).
4. Hypotheses: safe refuge thesis
Whereas the crowding out thesis focuses on incentives to social
participation, the safe refuge thesis focuses on constraints. It claims that
opportunity structures matter: citizens will opt to meet their needs
through that particular mode of participation which most likely maximizes






































sphere, they are more likely to participate in the intimate sphere
(Hochschild 1997). Studies on (post-)communist societies showed these
public modes of participation are less viable alternatives, when the state is
repressive (Bian 1997; Vo¨lker and Flap 2001; Howard 2003a). In these
repressive states, citizens ‘compartmentalized their lives into small social
networks made up of people whom they know well’ (Uslaner and Badescu
2003), i.e., the nuclear family and a few close friends (Mars and Altman
1992; Gibson 2003; Howard 2003b). These networks functioned ‘as a
refuge, a shelter, from the meddling by the government and party into
their private lives’ (Vo¨lker and Flap 2001). Participation in the public
sphere was no serious alternative due to uncertainty about the intentions
of strangers. Therefore, in communist societies, public distrust about a
repressive state drove citizens away from the public sphere and into
private networks (Howard 2003a,b).
These propositions on the repressive state and an untrustworthy public
sphere may not only apply to communist countries, but also to democratic
regimes (Eliasoph 1998; Howard 2003b). Democratic societies, too, differ
in the extent to which they guard the safety of the public sphere.
Repressive states limit the freedom and impartiality of the public sphere,
undermine civic autonomy, breed insecurity about public networks (Rose
1994), and promote participation in the intimate sphere (Bian 1997)
through several characteristics.
First, civic autonomy in the public sphere is affected by the extent to
which civil rights are enforced. Civil rights / like the freedom of speech
and the freedom of association / are a warrant for undisturbed access to
the public sphere. When states choose not to enforce these civil rights or to
limit them in times of war or civic disturbance, we expect citizens to revert
to social participation. Countries where civil rights are hardly enforced will
have a higher level of social participation than countries where civil rights
are strongly enforced.
The inverse effect of civil rights enforcement on social participation
may be stronger for people with a low income than for people with a high
income: financial means provide individuals more autonomy to man-
oeuvre, who therefore have less need for state guarantees.
H2a The weaker a state effectuates civil rights, the higher the level of social
participation.
H2b The effect of civil rights effectuation on social participation is stronger for the
economically weak compared to the economically strong.
Secondly, corruption in the state bureaucracy is considered to have
similar effects on civic autonomy in the public sphere. Objectively,
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corruption hampers the freedom and impartiality of the public sphere, as
it gives public officials strong but unchecked discretionary powers
(Transparency International 2000). Subjectively, people who perceive of
the public sphere as corrupt tend to have less institutional trust and opt to
participate in localized, informal networks instead of in the broader public
sphere (Eliasoph 1998). In highly corrupt states citizens mainly depend on
family ties to contact officials and find entrance to state arrangements
(Mars and Altman 1992). Hence, our third hypothesis claims:
H3 The more corrupt a state is, the higher the level of social participation.
Finally, in liberal democracies civic freedom and autonomy are
protected by the state. However, in young democracies social and political
trust have to be gained: civil society has to emerge and political life needs
to stabilize before the public sphere functions as well and / more
importantly / is perceived to be as safe as in longstanding democracies
where citizens are better socialized in the system (Rose 1994; Howard
2003b). After a democratic transition (i.e., abrupt institutional change), it
takes time and institutional stability for the (perception of a) safe public
sphere to arise. Therefore, we expect social participation to be high in new
democracies compared to longstanding democracies:
H4 The younger the democratic regime of a country, the higher the level of social
participation.
5. Contextual controls: economic development and religion
Besides the aforementioned state institutions, we will include economic
development in our study as a control factor because previous empirical
studies have found positive correlations with social participation (Knack
and Keefer 1997; Curtis et al. 2001; Van Oorschot and Arts 2005). We also
include religiosity at the state level. We expect that in more religious
countries, there is a culture of more intense participation not only in civic
associations (Ruiter and De Graaf 2006), but also with family members
and friends. Therefore, we expect social participation to be higher in more
devout countries.
6. Data and measurement
The research questions and hypotheses in this article are formulated on
two levels: the individual level (level 1) and the state level (level 2). The






































Programme (ISSP) module on Social Networks (2001), collected between
2000 and 2003. The data set contains questions on participation with
several specific members of the family as well as on friends.
Twenty-nine countries participated in the 2001 ISSP module. We left
out the few non-western countries, as the validity of the assumption of
institutional stability is questionable for these countries (Harty 2005). We
also excluded France due to a low response rate (14 percent), and Cyprus
and Japan due to lack of contextual data. In the end, we are left with 20
societies (for an overview of countries and country level variables, see
http://www.ru.nl/mt/tm/molders), containing a total of 27,537 respon-
dents of 18 years and older: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, Great Britain, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Latvia, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Russia, Slovenia, Spain,
Switzerland and the United States. All countries are democratic, and /
with the exception of Israel / dominantly Christian. The average response
rate is 60 percent. The sampling procedure differs per country (see the
ISSP report at http://www.za.uni-koeln.de/data/en/issp/codebooks/
issp2001app.pdf).
6.1. Dependent variables
We distinguish three forms of social participation: respondents’ frequency
of meetings with (i) nuclear family, (ii) best friend, and (iii) extended
family. We therefore constructed three variables, based on two- and three-
stage questions of the ISSP 2001.
The measure of participation with the nuclear family is constructed by
combining the respondent’s scores on four measures: meetings with his or
her father, mother, adult son or daughter (whom the respondent has the
most contact with), and sibling (whom the respondent has the most
contact with). We summed these scores and divided them by the
respondent’s number of alters in the nuclear family. For our study, the
average score is a better measure than the sum score. Of course, a
respondent who visits both her mother and her father weekly has more
informal contact than one who has only one parent which she visits weekly.
This difference would be reflected in the sum score, and not in the average
score. However, the difference between the two respondents is created by
family composition (the number of living relatives). This heavily distorts
the sum score. As we do not aim to explain the number of living relatives,
but the degree of informal contact given the availability of relatives, we will
use the average score. It measures the intensity of participation with the
nuclear family, given the number of alters.
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The measure of participation with the extended family is constructed
by combining respondents’ scores on contact with his/her uncle or aunt,
and with his/her cousin (both ranging from never (0) to more than twice
in the last four weeks (2)). This measure is constructed differently from
the previous one, as we do not know the number of alters in the extended
family. We could only exclude those who have no uncles/aunts or cousins
from the analysis.
The measure of participation with one’s best friend is more readily
available in the data set. We only have information on contact with the
single best friend, and not on contact with the whole network of friends.
Yet, as we are explicitly concerned with close ties, our measure of contact
with the single best friend is more suitable than information about a larger
network of friends.
We coded / for each of these variables separately / respondents who
stated not to have any (living) contact of that kind as missing and left them
out of the analysis. The measures of participation with one’s best friend
and with the nuclear family (or more precisely: with each of the four
underlying measures) range from 0 (no meetings) to 7 (he/she lives in the
same household as I do).1 The third measure / participation with the
extended family / ranges from 0 (no contact in the last four weeks) to 4
(more than twice contact with uncle or aunt, as well as more than twice
with cousin in the last four weeks).
For the measure of participation with the nuclear family we introduced
two types of controls to take effects of family composition into account.
The first control concerns the question which nuclear family ties are
available to the respondent. As people are more likely to meet their mother
or child than father or brother, it matters whether they have a (living)
father, mother, sibling and/or child when we explain participation with
the nuclear family. The second control concerns the selection bias in the
measurement of social participation with one’s son/daughter and with
1. The categories of this 8-point scale are: 0 (never), 1 (less than several times a year), 2
(several times a year), 3 (at least once a month), 4 (at least once a week), 5 (at least
several times a week), 6 (daily), 7 (lives in same household). We conceive of the latter
category as the most intensive value of social participation. For friendship ties the
prevalence is rather small: less than 2 percent lives in the same household as his/her
best friend. Yet for the nuclear family living together is more common: 6 percent lives
with a sibling, 10 percent with a father, 14 percent with a mother, and 15 percent with
an adult child. One might plausibly argue that category 7 has a qualitatively different
meaning from the other categories. Therefore, we estimated our parameters twice:
including and excluding the respondents in category 7. The outcomes of the analyses
were nearly identical for the level 2 and interaction effects we are most interested in,
both for contact with the nuclear family and contact with one’s best friend. Including






































one’s brother/sister. These variables measure participation with the child
or sibling whom the respondent has the most contact with. The number of
siblings and the number of adult children is likely to affect social
participation, positively (respondents who can select from a larger pool are
more likely to have a relative with whom they share interests) or negatively
(they have to divide their time over more close kin).
6.2. Independent variables
As we use a multilevel design to test hypotheses, we distinguish two types
of independent variables: contextual (country) level determinants and
individual level determinants. As our causal claim proposes that state
institutions come first, we collected institutional data from the year before
the individual level data were collected for the ISSP.
6.3. Contextual (country) level determinants
The crowding out hypothesis is implicitly concerned with the level of social
security, rather than the type of welfare state regimes (Esping-Andersen
1990). We therefore use the IMF-statistics on social security and health
care expenditure in 2000 from the annual Government Finance Statistics
and standardized the expenditures as a percentage of the GDP. These self-
reported IMF-statistics are internationally comparable because of the
strict definitions the IMF applies. The IMF-measure correlates strongly
(0.9) with OECD and ILO data. For some countries, data on social
security expenditures were not available for the appropriate year. In these
cases we used data from the next year because social security rates hardly
changed between adjacent years.
The measure of length of democratic rule, based on Inglehart (1997),
indicates how long a country has been democratic without disruption (with
1920 as starting point). The maximum age of a democracy in 2000 is 80.
Our measure of civil rights enforcement of the year 2000 is based on the
annual index from the Freedom House. Freedom House defines civil
liberties ‘to include the freedoms to develop views, institutions, and
personal autonomy apart from the state’. Countries are ranked on a scale
that ranges from 1 (no civil liberties) to 7 (high level of enforced civil
liberties). Although the index has been criticized as subjective (Bollen and
Paxton 2000), it is the best cross-national measure at our disposal.
By absence of a cross-country measure of corruption, we recoded a
measure of perceived corruption, namely the Corruption Perception Index
(CPI) 2000, issued by Transparency International. The CPI is based on
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multiple surveys in which experts are asked to rate countries’ level of
corruption. The measure of corruption ranges from 0 (no corruption) to
10 (highly corrupt).
At the contextual level we control for economic development in 2000,
measured as GDP/capita PPP which is considered a relevant contextual
determinant of citizen participation (Halman 2003). We used the measure
provided by the World Bank, which is strongly correlated (0.99) to
kindred measures of the OECD and the IMF. As a measure of national
level of religiosity we computed per country the average level of attendance
of religious services based on the ISSP 2001 data set (cf. Ruiter and De
Graaf 2006).2,3
6.4. Individual level determinants
In our analysis we need to control for individual level explanations of
social participation, as country level differences in social participation
may be the product of composition effects. We include the following
determinants: income, work status, age, sex, education, length of
residence in a community, marital status, religious denomination and
church attendance. Theoretically, income and work status are central to
our study. Income is measured by the actual amount of money available
to the household. As we could not construct a single cross-national
2. External measures on religiosity were all lacking theoretically or methodologically for
our purposes. Official data report church membership registration, but say little about
de facto involvement. Formal registration of church membership would selectively
overemphasize the level of religiosity, for instance for Scandinavian countries where
most citizens are registered as member, but relatively few participate. Actual church
involvement is cross-nationally measured in the World Churches Handbook (Brierly
1997). Yet, that study only focuses on Christian religions and leaves out all others.
Other measures of religiosity (religious pluralism, historically dominant
denomination, percentage nominal Catholics, percentage nominal Protestants)
suffered from theoretical and/or methodological flaws too. Moreover, neither added
to the variance already explained by the institutional factors.
3. The distribution of the scores follow a similar pattern on several measures (see
http://www.ru.nl/mt/tm/molders). Generally, longstanding, western democracies
score high on civil rights enforcement, absence of corruption, years of democratic rule
and economic development. East-European countries score lowest, and South-
European countries fall somewhat in the middle. Moreover, the average levels of social
participation follow a similar pattern (see footnote 7). To some extent, we thus explain
the differences between these clusters of countries. Nevertheless, as we prove
multicollinearity is not much of a problem in this study (see footnote 8), the question
remains which of these aforementioned factors explains social participation / and the






































measure of individual level income, we had to standardize income within
each country for reasons of comparability. Consequently, our measure of
individual level income cannot explain country level differences in levels
of participation, as the average is zero for all countries. This is partially
solved by the inclusion of economic development as a contextual
determinant. Work status distinguishes between those who do paid
work and those who do not: the unemployed, students, house-men and
wives, pensioned, and the disabled.4
7. Analyses
Both our hypotheses and our data are hierarchically structured: indivi-
duals (level 1) are nested in different countries (level 2) while social
participation is proposed to depend on both individual level and
contextual level predictors. To deal with this nested structure, we employ
multi-level analysis (hierarchical modelling) (Snijders and Bosker 1999)
using the ML-WIN 2.0 package (Goldstein 1995).
The scores on our dependent variables are quasi-metric, with 43
categories for the nuclear family, 8 for one’s best friend, and 5 for the
extended family. Formally, ordered logit multi-level regression is the most
appropriate method, although linear multi-level regression analysis is most
common in this field of research. We tried to apply ordered logit multi-
level regression, but in several packages our complicated models would not
converge. Therefore, we tested indirectly whether linear regression would
come to the same conclusions as ordered logit regression. Building on a
low intraclass correlation (see below), we temporarily ignored the
hierarchical structure of the data to apply ordinal regression via PLUM
(PoLytomous Universal Models). We found that the results of the PLUM-
models are similar to those of linear multi-level analysis, although of
course the standard errors of the country level determinants were
4. For both theoretical and methodological reasons, we did not control for other modes
of participation, neither at the individual level (i.e., voluntary association membership;
participation on the internet) or at the country level (i.e., organizational density;
internet availability; women’s employment). Firstly, the causal relationship between
social participation and these alternative modes of participation is unclear: would
involvement in these alternative networks be a cause or a consequence of (high or low)
participation with family and friends. Secondly, we have no a-priori reason to assume
inclusion of these alternative networks would affect the relationship between state
institutions and social participation, except as an intermediary factor. As the use of
control variables is mainly to account for spurious relationship, and not to
(over)control for intermediary explanations, we left the alternative networks out of
the analysis.
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uncorrected. This proved we could safely apply linear multi-level analysis
to our study, which we did. We used the Maximum likelihood procedure
as our estimation method, and the /2 LogLikelihood (2LL) to estimate
the model fit. To compare between models, we calculated the difference
between the 2LL, which is Chi-square distributed.5,6
Before we estimated the effects of level 1 and level 2 predictors, we
estimated a baseline model to establish whether there is significant variance
at the individual (s2e0ij) and at the contextual level (s2u0j).7 Respondents
with one or more missing values on any of the variables were left out of the
analyses; subsequent models are all based on the same set of respondents.
Next we calculated the ratio of the contextual level variance to the total
variance (s2e0ijs2u0j), the intraclass correlation. For all modes of social
participation, the variance turned out to be significant at both levels.
Secondly, we took composition effects into account by including
individual level determinants. In a third step we included all contextual
characteristics to measure the net impact of the state institutions on social
participation as described in hypotheses 1a, 2a, 3, and 4. Finally we tested
whether this impact varied with income and work status (hypotheses 1b and
2b) in random slope models. Results of all models can be found in Table 1.
8. Results
In both the baseline and the composition model, the individual and
country level variances are significant (a5 percent). To find out
whether multilevel analysis is not merely appropriate but also sensible,
intraclass-correlations were computed. In the baseline models, the
percentage of variance at the contextual level amounts to 14 percent
5. We tested the assumption of homoscedasticity, according to which the variance of
error is distributed equally across categories of x-variables. Although the model fit
improved when we allowed for heteroscedasticity, the parameters remained
substantially the same: neither in the effect size, nor in the standard errors did we
come to find any substantial difference.
6. We checked the assumption of normality by analysis of the residuals. We considered
the statistical tests of normality to be inappropriate here: for the individual level
variables we found significant, but irrelevant violations of the normality assumption,
whereas the test turned out insignificant for our country level variables due to the low
number of countries. Therefore, we focused on the normality plots. These showed no
harmful violation of the assumption of normality.
7. Descriptive analyses showed vast differences between countries, in line with the study
by Pichler and Wallace (2007). Social participation is about twice as high in Southern
Europe compared to the longstanding, western democracies. The former communist







































(nuclear family), 9 percent (friends) and 5 percent (extended family).
These are quite considerable percentages given that the dependent
variable is measured at the individual level, and most variance is to be
expected at the individual level (Steenbergen and Jones 2002). In other
words, there are quite large country level differences in the average level
social capital. The question is, whether these remain significant when we
control for all individual level variables. The second model takes these
composition effects into account. As a consequence the variance at the
contextual level drops with 20/25 percent. Moreover, the intraclass
correlations are hardly affected. These results indicate that it is
worthwhile to investigate the impact of state institutions on social
participation using a multilevel model.







Average 4.0 3.9 1.1
N 14242 15512 13080
Baseline model
s2u0j 0.332 0.182 0.085
s2e0ij 2.003 1.856 1.509
Intraclasscor. 0.141 0.089 0.053
2LL 50400.13 53698.63 42569.96
Composition model
s2u0j 0.205 0.128 0.058
s2e0ij 1.627 1.776 1.392
intraclasscor. 0.112 0.067 0.040
2LL 47432.93 53007.07 41515.74
Dev 2LL 2967.20 691.56 1054.22
Df 25 19 19
Full model (model A)
s2u0j 0.078 0.027 0.019
s2e0ij 1.627 1.776 1.392
Intraclasscor. 0.046 0.015 0.013
2LL 47414.10 52977.30 41495.43
Dev 2LL 18.83 29.77 20.31
Df 6 6 6
Full model including cross-level interactions (model B)
s2u0j 0.078 0.028 0.020
s2e0ij 1.622 1.775 1.389
intraclasscor. 0.046 0.016 0.014
2LL 47391.86 52971.51 41466.29
Dev 2LL 22.24 5.79 29.14
Df 9 9 9
245




































The third row in Table 1 shows that indeed the contextual determinants
significantly contribute to the explanation of social participation as the
decline of the 2loglikelihood (2LL) between models is significant. In
all ‘full models’ variance at the contextual level is strongly reduced (by
60/80 percent) by the inclusion of direct effects of contextual determi-
nants. Inclusion of interaction effects improves the models even further
for the nuclear and extended family. Table 2 gives insight in the direct
effects of the individual and contextual level determinants.8
As we are most interested in the direct effects of the state institutional
determinants, we did not display the individual level control factors in
Table 2. The effects of these control factors can be found in the full
models on our webpage: http://www.ru.nl/mt/tm/molders.








Has a father 0.30 (0.03)
Has a mother 0.13 (0.03)
Has a sibling 0.64 (0.04)
Number of siblings 0.01 (0.01)
Has a child 0.59 (0.04)
Number of children 0.04 (0.01)
State level predictors
Social security expenditure 0.48 (1.72) 0.05 (1.04) 1.90 (0.90)
Years of democracy 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00)
Civil rights 0.22 (0.12) 0.23 (0.07) 0.09 (0.06)
Corruption 0.03 (0.08) 0.02 (0.05) 0.03 (0.04)
GDP/capita PPP (* 1000) 0.03 (0.02) 0.03 (0.01) 0.04 (0.01)
Average church attendance 0.01 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
s2u0j 0.078 0.027 0.019
s2e0ij 1.627 1.776 1.392
Intraclasscor. 0.046 0.015 0.013
Bold figures represent significant effects at the 0.05-level, one-tailed.
We controlled for income, work status, age, sex, education, length of residence in a community,
marital status, religious denomination and church attendance. The full models, including effects
of the control factors, are available on our webpage: http://www.ru.nl/mt/tm/molders.
8. These results were tested for their stability by perturbation analyses (based on Belsley
1991). High correlations among the level 2 determinants and the relatively small
sample of countries might lead to incorrect conclusions due to multicollinearity. In
perturbation analyses we introduced / within theoretically reasonable margins /
random errors on our level 2 determinants and retested our models one hundred







































We find no evidence for a general crowding out effect of primordial ties.
Social security expenditure does not have a significant effect on
participation with the nuclear family, nor on participation with friends.
This refutes H1a. However, we find that social security expenditure is
inversely related to participation with the extended family, which supports
H1a. In absolute terms the effect is far from small: 5 percent GDP
additional social security accounts for a decline of the country average
participation with the extended family to 1 point on our 5-point scale.
Hypothesis H2a is supported by the results in Table 2: the more a state
effectuates civil rights, the lower the level of participation with the nuclear
family and with one’s best friend. We find no support at all for hypothesis
H3: the effect of corruption is insignificant in all models.
The age of a democracy is inversely related to all three modes of social
participation which supports hypothesis H4: longstanding democracies
have a lower level of social participation than newly developed democ-
racies. Yet, although significant, the effects are effectively rather small in
absolute terms: having 80 years of democracy (the maximum) accounts for
an average decrease of less than three-quarters of a point on our social
participation scales.
As for our control factors at the contextual level, economic development
has a positive effect on social participation: countries with a higher GDP/
capita PPP have a higher level of social participation. This effect is,
however, not significant for participation in the nuclear family. The
average level of religiosity does not have an effect on social participation.
In short, we only find support for the crowding out thesis with regard
to the extended family. The refuge thesis is supported for civil rights
enforcement and democracy, but not for corruption. Next, the question
comes up whether these effects are equally strong for different social
groups. We tested this with cross-level interaction effects in random slope
models, where the individual level effects of income and work status are
allowed to vary across countries.
Table 3 shows significant cross-level interaction effects for participation
with the nuclear and with the extended family. The interaction of social
security and income is in line with hypothesis H1b, which stated that the
impact of social security is stronger for people with a low income than for
people with a high income. The negative effect of social security on
participation with the extended family is strong and significant for the 5
percent of the people with the lowest income (i.e.,4.15),9 but nearly
9. The net effect of social security on participation with the extended family is calculated
as follows: -2.11 (the main effect of social security) 1.65 (the Z-score of income for
the poorest 5 percent) * 1.24 (the interaction effect of social security and income) 
4.15. Calculations for the other total effects follow the same procedure.
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absent for the 5 percent wealthiest people (i.e., 0.66 and non-
significant) / see Figure 1c. For the nuclear family and friends, however,
we do not find support for hypothesis H1b.
We do not find any evidence that the effect of social security
expenditure is more strongly negative for recipients of social security








Income 0.11 (0.12) 0.09 (0.08) 0.17 (0.09)
Work status (employed)
Unemployed 0.42 (0.20) 0.12 (0.05) 0.10 (0.05)
Student 0.16 (0.32) 0.11 (0.06) 0.20 (0.06)
Houseman/-Wife 0.00 (0.19) 0.02 (0.04) 0.06 (0.04)
Pensioned 0.12 (0.12) 0.06 (0.04) 0.15 (0.04)
Disabled 0.44 (0.27) 0.08 (0.07) 0.31 (0.30)
Has a father 0.29 (0.03)  
Has a mother 0.13 (0.03)  
Has a sibling 0.64 (0.04)  
Number of siblings 0.01 (0.01)  
Has a child 0.61 (0.04)  
Number of children 0.03 (0.01)  
State level predictors
Social security expenditure 0.58 (1.73) 0.16 (1.06) 2.11 (0.91)
Years of democracy 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00)
Civil rights 0.22 (0.12) 0.19 (0.07) 0.08 (0.06)
Corruption 0.03 (0.08) 0.00 (0.04) 0.02 (0.04)
GDP/capita PPP (* 1000) 0.03 (0.02) 0.04 (0.01) 0.04 (0.01)
Average church attendance 0.01 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Cross-level interactions
Soc.sec. * Income 0.61 (0.46) 0.12 (0.30) 1.24 (0.32)
Soc.sec. * Work status (employed)
* Unemployed 1.45 (0.96) 0.02 (1.04) 0.17 (0.91)
* Student 1.14 (1.39) 1.19 (1.44) 1.69 (1.29)
* Houseman/-Wife 0.02 (0.88) 0.13 (0.91) 0.60 (0.86)
* Pensioned 0.16 (0.54) 0.48 (0.57) 1.04 (0.72)
* Disabled 2.37 (1.26) 1.54 (1.41) 2.55 (1.38)
Civil rights * Income 0.02 (0.02) 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.02)
s2u0j 0.078 0.028 0.020
s2e0ij 1.623 1.775 1.389
Intraclasscor. 0.046 0.016 0.014
Bold figures represent significant effects at the 0.05-level, one-tailed.
We controlled for age, sex, education, length of residence in a community, marital status,
religious denomination and church attendance. The full models, including effects of the control






































than for people with a job (hypothesis H1b). All interaction effects are
non-significant, save for one group. For disabled people, we find a positive
effect of social security expenditure. Rather than crowding out their need
for family, we must conclude that social security apparently enables
disabled people to keep in contact with their nuclear and extended
family / possibly through health care provision and public transport.













































































Figure 1. Cross-level interaction effect: social security, work status and contact with
the nuclear family.
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Hypothesis H2b is not supported. The cross-level interaction effects of
civil rights enforcement and income are not significant / at least not after
controlling for other interaction effects.
The significant cross-level interaction effects are not only relevant for
research on state institutions, but also for those who study the individual
level association between income/work status and family relations. From
a different, but equally valid, point of view, they imply that the strength
and even the direction of the individual level association between
income/work status and social participation is conditioned by the
institutional environment.
9. Summary and discussion
This study started out from theoretical explorations that claimed a large
role for states as a determinant of informal relations. To test these claims,
we formulated three research questions in this article. The first question
was related to the differences in social participation across countries.
There are significant and rather large differences across countries, as was
signalled by the significant country level variance and the high intraclass
correlations. To answer the second and third question, we estimated the
influence of several state institutions on social participation simultaneously
and tested whether this impact was equal across social categories. We
demonstrated that state institutions indeed have a significant impact on
social participation, even when we control for other individual level and
other contextual determinants. In short: States matter. But they matter
more for the poor than for the rich.
The crowding out thesis was only supported for a specific group (i.e.,
the poor) and for specific ties (i.e., the extended family). Contact with the
extended family relies at least partly on economic necessity: in less
extensive social security states, poor people build an economic safety net
by intensifying contacts with the extended family.10 Despite dominant
thought (cf. Scheepers et al. 2002; Ka¨a¨ria¨inen and Lehtonen 2006), social
security does not unilaterally crowd out functions of the family, but only
those of the extended family. This implies that breaking down social
security programs may not stimulate participation with the nuclear family
and with friends. Apparently, participation within one’s nuclear family or
with one’s best friend is not motivated by economic needs. Rather, these
10. This might explain why Scheepers, Te Grotenhuis and Gelissen (2002) find a
negative effect of welfare state expenditure on social participation among the elderly,






































ties are more exclusively motivated by needs that are overlooked by the
crowding out thesis / emotional support, recreation, or simply routine.
This study offers more support for the safe refuge thesis. The age of
the democracy and civil rights enforcement both affect social participa-
tion. In longstanding democracies that enforce civil rights, citizens do
not need to revert to their secure informal ties, but feel more confident
to obtain their instrumental and expressive goals in the public sphere.
On the other hand, a country’s level of corruption does not have a
significant impact on social participation when we control for other
contextual determinants.
An important limitation of this study remains the issue of causality.
We dealt with this issue in two ways: we focused on countries with
relatively stable state institutions, and derived our measures for these
state institutions from the years preceding the ISSP survey. Never-
theless, the issue of causality can not be solved definitively in this cross-
sectional study.
Perhaps, this chicken-and-the-egg discussion might be too limited. We
should not think in terms of single lines of causality, but in terms of
spirals of causality (Rothstein 1998). The crowding out thesis, for
instance, was originally formulated as a spiral of causality (cf. de
Tocqueville 2000 [1835/1840]; Nisbet 1962 [1953]): ever more extensive
states and ever more atomized citizens only served to stimulate each
other. On the one hand, extensive states atomized its citizenry, but on
the other hand, this atomized citizenry needed to depend on the state
and offered little counterweight to the expanding state. Reasoning in
terms of these spirals makes the discussion of causality obsolete.
Nevertheless, the conclusions of this study would still stand: states
matter in family life.
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